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Rozważania dotyczące pojmowania sprawiedliwości
ABSTRACT
The article has addressed the problem of understanding justice. The traditional formula “to render 
to everyone his own” (suum cuique tribuere) was taken as the point of departure. The discussion 
leads to the conclusion that natural justice applies to every person, and that every person is entitled 
to natural, innate, fundamental human rights. The traditional formula with regard to law should be 
understood as a principle-norm, a principle of law that imposes an obligation to render to everyone 
what is due. It is the duty of authorities (which manage the social life) to implement this obligation. 
The innate natural rights enshrined and safeguarded in positive law will be combined with the statutory, 
precise, strengthened norms of this law, and thus enhanced (since it is a natural obligation, a moral 
and legal obligation, of the human being not to violate these natural rights) with the prohibition of 
violating them by others.
Keywords: justice; human being; innate human rights; fundamental human rights; principle of 
law; natural justice
INTRODUCTION
It would seem that the issue of justice and its meaning is sufficiently recognized 
and discerned. One may think that nothing new can be written on justice and its 
notion.
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But still, and despite the huge, enormous multitude of works that can fill many 
libraries, the issue of justice – including its understanding – is subject to debate, 
especially depending on the philosophical position taken. It must be stressed, even 
more strongly, that this is a very contentious category. It should be added that it 
is sometimes confusing, a bit vague, complicated, and certainly a multifaceted, 
difficult and very complicated issue.
Over the course of many centuries, thinkers, philosophers, moralists, ethicists, 
poets, writers, social reformers, economists and of course lawyers used to undertake 
reflection about justice. We may come across various concepts, approaches and 
theories of justice in the literature on the subject.
Of course, the problem of justice, including its understanding, constitutes one 
of the central philosophical and legal problems. It is a classic subject, still valid, 
inherent in the law. According to many, justice is the most important value asso-
ciated with law.1 Let us recall, Domitius Ulpianus (Ulpian) derived the concept of 
law from justice.2 Gustav Radbruch stated: “The idea of law may only be justice”.3 
John Rawls wrote: “[…] justice is the first virtue of social institutions”.4
However, the category of justice has generally been subjectified and relativised 
today, its moral or ethical character has been lost, the narratives characteristic of 
liberal, utilitarian and neo-Marxist thought are still in fashion and dominate. It is 
assumed that the basis of justice is convention. This category is based on some 
kind of social and pragmatic convention, contractual constructs (a hypothetical 
contract5), or experiences, feelings and emotions. The scientific literature often 
1 This concerns both the fairness of the law itself and its fair application.
2 When explaining the meaning of the word ius, D. Ulpian derives the notion of law from 
justice. Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat. – Est autem a iustitia 
appellatum (“A prospective lawyer at the beginning of his studies should know where the word ‘law’ 
[ius] originates. It is derived from justice [iustitia])” (D. Ulpianus, D. 1.1.1 pr.).
3 G. Radbruch, Filozofia prawa, transl. E. Nowak, Warszawa 2009, p. 37 (English version for 
reference: idem, Legal Philosophy, transl. K. Wilk, [in:] The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, 
and Dabin, Cambridge 1950). In the discussion on the notion of law, we can read: “[…] law is the 
reality whose sense and meaning is to serve a kind of value (dem Rechtswerte) […]. The fact that 
justice is the ultimate and impassable starting point also entitles us to accept that everything that is 
fair […] has an absolute value that cannot be derived from any other value”.
4 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard 1971, p. 513. As J. Rawls writes, “laws and institutions 
no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust” (ibidem). 
Cf., e.g., R.A. Tokarczyk, Sprawiedliwość jako naczelna wartość prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1997, 
no. 6, s. 3–20.
5 More broadly, see J. Rawls, op. cit. It is worth noting that Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seri-
ously, London – New York 1977, p. 186) states in this context: “Rawls does not suppose that any group 
ever entered into a social contract of the sort he describes. He argues only that if a group of rational men 
did find themselves in the predicament of the original position, they would contract for the two prin-
ciples. His contract is hypothetical, and hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent argument 
for the fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual 
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refers to the “strong emotional colouration of this term”.6 As Zygmunt Ziembiński 
wrote: “[…] defining the meaning of the word is a very complex matter, especially 
since the term requires multifaceted relativism”.7 Maria Ossowska stated as follows:
When we address the issue of justice, we know in advance that we will not satisfy anyone with 
our comments. The notion of justice has such an enormous scope of associations and such a great 
emotional charge that it is difficult to respect all the intuitions associated with it.8
It is often explicitly argued that the foundations of justice are arbitrary. Chaïm 
Perelman states that:
Any system of justice is merely a development of one or more values whose arbitrary nature 
is related to their very nature. This allows us to understand why there is no single system of justice, 
why there can be as many as different values.9
And further, with regard to justice, this author writes: “[…] it must not be 
forgotten that its operation is based on arbitrary, irrational values and that these 
values are opposed by other values, which cannot be completely ignored by the 
sense of justice”.10
NOTION OF JUSTICE
When it comes to understanding justice, we take as our starting point the tradi-
tional formula: “to render to everyone his own” (suum cuique tribuere).11
But what is due? What and to whom?
contract; it is no contract at all”. The defective nature of the Rawls’ concept is referred to by Zygmunt 
Ziembiński (Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako pojęcie prawne, Warszawa 1996, pp. 48–49). Naturally, 
the Rawls’ construct is a hypothetical and abstract model. Harry Brighouse (Justice, Cambridge 2004, 
p. 8) notes that since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, “All theorizing about justice in the 
English language since that time operates within a framework set by Rawls. Even if a theorist disagrees, 
absolutely, with everything Rawls says, the theorist has to explain why […]”.
6 Cf. S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, Poznań 1997, p. 95. Similarly Z. Ziem-
biński, Sprawiedliwość…, p. 11; idem, Zarys zagadnień etyki, Poznań–Toruń 1994, p. 79. Chaïm 
Perelman (O sprawiedliwości, transl. W. Bieńkowska, Warszawa 1959, p. 107) writes that due to 
the very emotional nature of the values underlying each normative system, the exercise of justice in 
practice is an operation involving also the emotional factor and that the whole justice system may 
have some emotional flavour given to it by the basic value the rational development of which it 
constitutes. Cf. ibidem, p. 90.
7 S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, op. cit., p. 95.
8 M. Ossowska, Normy moralne. Próba systematyzacji, Warszawa 1985, p. 138.
9 Ch. Perelman, op. cit., p. 98.
10 Ibidem, p. 109.
11 The formula “justice is rendering to everyone his due” was well known to Plato and Aristotle. 
As an example, cf. Platon, Państwo, transl. W. Witwicki, Kęty 2009, Book I, 332C, p. 19. Cf. M. Pie-





A. To whom first? And here it must be stressed that justice concerns a human 
being. It applies to every human being. Thus, justice does not refer to an abstract, 
an idea, but a concrete. Justice applies to that reality which is human being.
And if one asks: when a human being starts to be a human being? A human is 
from the moment he or she comes into existence.12 Mieczysław A. Krąpiec wrote 
as follows about this issue:
[…] a fertilized human ovum is already a real human being, with a full information “bit” manag-
ing “from within” the development of the human being in his womb stage regardless of the parents’ 
(mother’s) influence. And it does not seem possible to explain the nature of the human foetus (even if 
it were the first days of life of a fertilized ovum) other than to say that this is already a human being, 
organizing the matter for himself to be a full, functional human body.13
Let us repeat, justice applies to human being. Of course, the term “justice” 
is used in various meanings. It is used in relation to man himself (a just man), to 
human deeds,14 to someone’s conduct or action.15 There is talk of fair or unfair law 
(laws, regulations), fair or unfair procedure, also about fair or unfair trial, about fair 
or not decision. But these different meanings are related to the original dimension.
Regardless of whether justice is referred to the man himself as his quality (e.g. 
a just judge), or his deeds, actions, justice concerns the human being. And regardless 
of whether we relate it to institutions, laws, norms, decisions on the application of 
the law – justice concerns the human being.
Since we refer the term “justice” to human being,16 it does not apply to non-hu-
man beings, it does not apply to animals.17 Man is a special being, so different from 
others available to our (human) direct cognition.18 It differs from animals. Of all 
beings living on earth, man is the most perfect being, the most important, is the 
chowiak, Do Platona po naukę o prawach człowieka, [in:] Księga jubileuszowa profesora Tadeusza 
Jasudowicza, eds. J. Białocerkiewicz, M. Balcerzak, A. Czeczko-Durlak, Toruń 2004, pp. 339–345.
12 More on data from biological sciences (especially embryology and genetics), as well as on 
philosophical arguments, see W. Dziedziak, O prawie słusznym (perspektywa systemu prawa stano-
wionego), Lublin 2015, pp. 126–140.
13 M.A. Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne, Lublin 2009, p. 240.
14 That they are or they are not fair.
15 Aristotle writes in the opening sentence of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics: “With regards to 
justice and injustice we must consider what kind of actions they are concerned with” (Arystoteles, 
Etyka nikomachejska, transl. D. Gromska, Warszawa 2008, Book V, 1, 1129a).
16 Justice occurs between people. Justice is not referred to in relations between animals, or 
between man and an object.
17 Another view is proposed by, e.g., R. Ingarden, Wykłady z etyki, Warszawa 1989, p. 274 ff. This 
author discusses fair human behaviour towards animals. Some contemporary law theorists strongly 
claim that people can act fairly or unfairly towards animals.
18 Man appears to be an extraordinary being.
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“peak form of being”.19 It is a being on which the positive law also recognizes its 
inherent dignity by deriving human rights from it.20
It must also be noted that justice is directed towards others. Justice is a concern, 
as is sometimes claimed, about someone else’s good.21 So we are not talking about 
justice towards ourselves.22
B. And what is due? Justice demands that “render everyone his own”. Suum 
cuique – to give everyone his due. And what to give, what is everyone’s due? 
What is one’s own, what is due? This is about human rights. Human being has his 
entitlements, has rights resulting from his innate dignity. These rights are rooted in 
the very ontic human structure. These are natural rights. The formula “to render to 
everyone his own” is usually associated with a natural entitlement, one’s right, the 
right to something, and therefore to render “something to which one is entitled”.
Justice is the respect for the rights owed to man. Their source, let us repeat it, is 
rooted in the inherent dignity of human being, and therefore they are natural rights. 
These natural rights must be ensured, guaranteed and pursued by positive law. The 
mere existence of those rights obliges the legislative authority (the persons holding 
positions within it) to safeguard them, to make them real. The most fundamental 
ones are the right of every person to live and the right to personal development. 
However, it must be strongly emphasized that these are real natural rights, not the 
entitlements resulting from some ideological pressure or even manipulation.23 For 
there is a risk of recognition of some ostensible rights as human rights and even 
innate rights.24
19 M.A. Krąpiec (Człowiek jako osoba, Lublin 2009, p. 26) states: “[…] the being structure of 
man is something absolutely unique in the whole of nature and therefore it cannot be reduced to one 
side of its existence – be it the purely psycho-spiritual side (as R. Descartes and some of his followers 
wanted to see man), or the purely material, animal side, or even worse, to a pure, subjectless structure, 
which ultimately works (and exists) by chance.”
20 Cf. e.g. Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of 
Laws 1997, no. 78, item 483 as amended). English translation of the Constitution at: www.sejm.gov.
pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm [access: 10.05.2021].
21 Aristotle (op. cit., 1130a) states: “[…] justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be ‘another’s 
good’”.
22 Another view, but not without doubts regarding this issue, was presented by R. Ingarden 
(op. cit., pp. 272–274).
23 Thus, this is about innate, objective rights of human being. However, under law, recourse to 
human dignity today unfortunately does not seem to be enough. We can even talk about divergence 
between human dignity and human life (and its protection). Cf. E. Picker, Godność człowieka a życie 
ludzkie. Rozbrat dwóch fundamentalnych wartości jako wyraz narastającej relatywizacji człowieka, 
transl. J. Merecki, Warszawa 2007, p. 35.
24 Unfortunately, the category of dignity in legal terms happens to be deformed by some (which, 
of course, is a misunderstanding and a mistake) who derive from this category rights against man, 
e.g. to abortion, euthanasia.





Human rights were aptly read and expressed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948. This Declaration, as it is sometimes 
noted in the literature, articulates natural rights,25 although it seems that it does so 
not fully clear when it comes to the first of these rights, namely the right to life, 
the right to be born.
The right to personal development, or the right to integral human development, 
concerns physical, intellectual and moral development. The personal development 
of human being – this category is not an expression of some particular thinking spe-
cific to certain currents of philosophy, it is not some abstraction. This is referred to 
in normative regulations, primarily in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
One can mention here Article 25 UDHR which reads: “Everyone has the right to 
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family […]”; Article 26 UDHR which states: “Everyone has the right to education. 
[…] Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
[…]”; and Article 23 UDHR, which reads: “Everyone has the right to work […]. 
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity […]”. Important in 
this matter are Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,26 according to which States Parties recognize the “right to 
work”, “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions 
of work, which ensure, in particular […] fair wages and equal remuneration for 
work of equal value without distinction of any kind […], a decent living for them-
selves and their families […], equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in 
his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other 
than those of seniority and competence […]”. Article 13 of this Covenant states 
that “education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”. Also, Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child27 states that: “States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be di-
rected to the development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical 
abilities to their fullest potential”. Even only these articles indicate the importance 
of comprehensive human development.
But of course, to be able to grow, one has to be. One has to exist. Let us stress 
here that the starting point is the right to life, the right to birth. The right to life 
25 Cf. H. Waśkiewicz, Prawo naturalne – prawo czy norma moralna, „Roczniki Filozoficzne” 
1970, vol. 18(2), p. 15; M.A. Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo…, p. 299.
26 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature in New 
York on 19 December 1966 (UNTS vol. 993, p. 3).
27 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
20 November 1989 (UNTS vol. 1577, p. 3).
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from the moment of conception is a synthesis of all rights, all others lose their 
meaning without it.
Undoubtedly, justice requires ensuring conditions that are conducive to human 
development and ensuring dignified existence of the individual in society. It is 
about ensuring the conditions leading to the fullness of human existence and life. 
Legal regulations are to establish structures and institutions designed to ensure the 
possibility of comprehensive development. The law, through appropriate regula-
tion, should support human being in his development. Of course, this development 
concerns health, education, knowledge, work and fair remuneration, freedom, 
property, security.
C. And what does it mean to “render” everyone his due? One can also use the word 
“guarantee” or “provide”. When we consider justice in relation to law, this concerns 
the normative dimension. Justice should be regarded as a norm, which relates to the 
whole formula being analysed. And norm is a rule of conduct, a model of behaviour. 
Justice thus approached imposes an obligation (imperative) to give everyone what is 
due. And we know that this is about rights, fundamental human rights. Of course, we 
do not play down the role of justice as a virtue. The virtue of justice enables people 
to respect other’s rights. It can be said that norm also “demands” virtue, this perma-
nent inclination of will, the ability to give everyone his due, as if it “cried out for 
virtue”. However, from a juridical point of view it is about a norm, and indeed more 
than a norm, about the principle-norm, about the principle of law. The principle that 
imposes a moral and legal obligation to render to everyone his own. Justice orders 
giving what is due, and thus further reinforces the need to safeguard and protect these 
natural rights, these fundamental human rights, and guarantees them.
NATURAL JUSTICE AS AN OBLIGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORITY
Positive law, if it is to be fair, must take into account the requirements of justice, 
which we call natural justice, expressed by the formula, not empty one but filled 
with content, and which is an imperative: “to give everyone what is due”, which 
can also be expressed as “to give everyone his own”.
Assuming, as has already been said, that the existence of natural human rights, 
stemming from natural human dignity, obliges the legislature (its holders) to safe-
guard them, and the principle-norm of justice with its power strengthens and further 
justifies this obligation.
Natural justice is supposed to become the rules and norms of law. Taking it very 
generally, one can say that justice is aimed at “doing good” and “avoiding evil”.
Let us think again: What kind of positive law is fair, then? Let us reiterate 
and stress: positive law is fair when it respects, protects, enforces and guarantees 





natural justice. Then, these innate rights enshrined and safeguarded in positive law 
will be combined with the statutory (precise, strengthened norms of this law, and 
thus enhanced28) prohibition of violating them by others. A fair law (referring to 
the earlier statement here) is supposed to “facilitate the doing of good and hinder 
the doing of wrong”.
Attempts to base justice in relation to the law not based on innate dignity and 
natural law, but on other foundations, lead to the relativisation of this category.
Let us add that understanding natural justice (and its requirements) is a precon-
dition (when we speak of actual, not apparent justice) for introducing other forms, 
types or kinds of justice. This applies, in particular, to its basic types, i.e. distribu-
tive justice and corrective justice, which should be in some sense a “reflection of 
natural justice”, and therefore involve some kind of equality, non-discrimination, 
non-arbitrariness, impartiality and fairness.
CONCLUSION
It seems that this study, even if only to some extent, has shown that the tradition-
al formula of “rendering everyone his due” is neither empty nor “strictly formal”29 
nor absurd, as is sometimes claimed. The currently dominant relativisation and 
subjectification of the category under review make it important to try to identify 
the objective content of justice.
It is worth noting that the considerations concerned the kind of justice we called 
natural justice. It is the responsibility of the authority (which manages social life)30 
to implement justice. If its requirements are not implemented, then by no means is 
28 Still, the non-infringement of these innate rights is a natural obligation, one may say: a legal 
and moral obligation of human being.
29 Cf. K. Ajdukiewicz, O sprawiedliwości, [in:] Język i poznanie, vol. 1, Warszawa 1985, s. 367.
30 It is worth citing J. Rawls, who starts with different assumptions (liberal ones, the social 
contract) and approaches justice differently, but his thought expressed in A Theory of Justice is worth 
attention: “Those in authority are accountable for the policies they pursue and the instructions they lay 
down. And those who acquiesce in carrying out unjust commands or in abetting evil designs cannot in 
general plead that they did not know better or that the fault rests solely with those in higher positions” 
(J. Rawls, op. cit., p. 455). On the other hand, David Lyons writes that “the fact that someone holds 
a public office does not necessarily mean that they are morally obliged to be attached to law. If so, 
an official who is to enforce an unjust law may not have any moral dilemma. He may be exposed to 
a risk if he decides to challenge an unjust law, but his departure from the law will not automatically 
violate some moral principle, including the principle of justice. […] since the official has a general 
duty to obey the law, we can assume that the law has its moral limits. If the law he has to enforce is 
sufficiently immoral, then there is no moral argument for him to adhere to it, even if he has honestly 
undertaken to apply the law as it is” (D. Lyons, Etyka i rządy prawa, transl. P. Maciejko, Warszawa 
2000, pp. 81–82). John Paul II wrote: “To refuse to take part in committing an injustice is not only 
a moral duty; it is also a basic human right” (John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, 74, www.vatican.va/
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it an argument against it. It will therefore remain unfair “not to give a person what 
is due”. And it must be added that justice entails responsibility.
And one more remark. What is puzzling is the popularity, promotion and ba-
sically domination of the procedural approach and the understanding of justice 
not only in Polish legal sciences.31 The Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic 
of Poland also recognizes that the principle of procedural fairness is a “value in 
itself”.32 This perception of justice makes it sometimes difficult for an educated 
lawyer to discern and figure out what is fair and what is not.
Nevertheless, the question of natural, substantive justice, is still and will be 
relevant, as it concerns man and his innate, fundamental rights, including the first 
among all, i.e. the right to life from the moment of conception.
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ABSTRAKT
W artykule podjęto zagadnienie pojmowania sprawiedliwości. Jako punkt wyjścia przyjęto trady-
cyjną formułę „oddać każdemu to, co mu się należy” (suum cuique tribuere). Rozważania prowadzą 
do stwierdzenia, że sprawiedliwość naturalna dotyczy każdego człowieka, należne są mu naturalne, 
przyrodzone uprawnienia, podstawowe prawa człowieka. Tradycyjna formuła w odniesieniu do prawa 
powinna być rozumiana jako zasada-norma, zasada prawa, która nakłada/narzuca obowiązek oddania 
każdemu tego, co mu się należy. Jego realizacja jest obowiązkiem władzy (zawiadujących życiem 
społecznym). Przyrodzone naturalne uprawnienia wpisane i zabezpieczone w prawie pozytywnym 
(stanowionym) będą łączyły się z prawnopozytywnym, sprecyzowanym, umocnionym normami tego 
prawa i tym samym wzmocnionym (gdyż niezmiennie nienaruszanie tych naturalnych uprawnień jest 
obowiązkiem moralno-prawnym człowieka) zakazem ich naruszania przez drugich, przez innych.
Słowa kluczowe: sprawiedliwość; człowiek; przyrodzone uprawnienia; podstawowe prawa czło-
wieka; zasada prawa; sprawiedliwość naturalna
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